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Considerable attention has been focused on rural nQn-farm
enterprises in recent years by donor agencies and development
specialists. Micro- and small-scale enterpriseshave also been the
subject of many recentstudies.Undoubtedly,part of this interestis
due to the growing realization that large-scale, modern
industrializationstrategiesofpreviousdecades have failedto solve
the problemsofunderemploymentand poverty(Liedholmand Mead
1987). Ithasbeenpopulartoviewsupportformicroenterprisesasan
effectiveway to stimulatethe privatesector'scontributionto growth
and equity objectives of developing countries. Non-governmental
(NGOs) and private voluntaryorganizations(PVOs), in particular,
have become active in support programs of credit, training and
technical assistancefor urban and rural small-scale enterprises.
This paper aims to present a summary of the large and growing
literature about donor experience in attempting to meet employment
and income objectives through assistance to the rural non-farm
sector, with emphasis on micro- and small-scale enterprises. Key
conclusions about these experiences are presented stressing those
with implications for rural development in the Philippines, and for the
research to be conducted in the Dynamics of Rural Development
Research Program ofthe Philippine Institutefor Development Studies
'>Preparedfor the Consultation-Worksholo onthe Dynamics of RuralDevelopment(DRD)
Projectorganizedby the PhilippineInstitutefor DevelopmentStudies. August30-31 at
Ternate. Cavlte.The workshopis,partof the DRD ResearchProgramfundedunderthe
TechnicalResourcesProjectofthe UnitedStatesAgencyfor InternationalDevelopment
(USAID)andcoursedthroughthe NationalEconomic Development Authority(NEDA).
_*Professor.Departmentof Agricultural Economics and RuralSociology.The Ohio State
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(PIDS). Much of the literature available in this field is of two types.
One type concerns the experience of the donor or international
agency in providing assistance to countries through projects
designed for certain target groups, enterprises or regions. Since
much of this assistance involves credit, this paper focuses on the
lessons learned in attempting to provide credit services to the target
clientele. The second type of literature concerns an economic
analysis of the group or sector being assisted. Such literature seeks
to answer economic questions like the role of small-scale or rural
non-farm enterprises in creating employment and generating income,
the efficiency and profitability of various firm sizes, and the dynamic
process of enterprise creation and growth.
A COMMENT ON DEFINITIONS
The first problem encountered in conductinga literature review
encompassingseveral studies, countries, and authors is the wide
rangeof definitions'usedto identifyand studyenterprises,firms and
sectors.The terms "small" and "micro"are usedto describesize of
firm, usuallymeasuredin termsof employmentor assets. The term
"microenterprises" refers to the smallest-size firms, frequently
employingonlythe owner/entrepreneurand his/herfamilywith onlya
few workers.Althoughsome small-scalefirms operateon a modern
industrialbasis, mostare generallyorganizedas,cottage industries"
with limitedmanagement specializationand divisionof labor (World
Bank 1980). The terms small and micro also frequently imply
"informality" because these firms tend to fall outside the sphere of
influence, regulationand support of government. Informality gives
these firms the advantage of avoiding restrictive government
regulations, but can also limit their access to formal finance, and
broader markets,technologiesand informationsystemsthat would
enablethem togrowand benefitfrom economiesof scale.
The term "non-farm enterprises" has been applied to the
heterogenousset of undertakingsfoundon and off farms but which
are notincluded in the typical farm productionstudy (Meyer 1991).
Processingactivitiesconductedwithinthe farm householdare often
included in this definition, in addition, these enterprises cover
economicactivitiesfound in villagesand small towns, often closely
linkedtoagricultureby providinginputs,or processingand marketing
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but much of the research has focused on those which fall within the
micro- and small-size category.
The emphasis of industry studies tends to be on "manufacturing."
However, the rural non-farm sector includes a vast range of service
and trading enterprises, and other firms indispensable to the
agricultural sector, and which provide a large amount of employment
and income, especially for women, in many countries. Most donor
credit programs, though, have only recently recognized the value of
including non-manufacturing activities in their list of projects eligible
for funding through subloans.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "rural non-farm
enterprises" will be used to encompass the heterogenous set of
economic activities found on and off the farm, but usually strongly
linked to agriculture. They tend to be small in size, measured in
assets or employees, and use largely traditional methods of
production and simple forms of organization. No effort is made to
specifically include "agribusinesses" in this review because the
agribusiness literature often centers around larger-size firms,
frequently with international linkages, and using modern production,
processing and marketing techniques. Undoubtedly, large-scale
agribusinesses are important in shaping the rate and nature of rural
development, and in indirectly creating opportunities for smaller-
scale, more traditional enterprises in the rural non-farm sector.
However, they are less frequently the focus of donor assistance
programs, and in some countries, there is a heated debate about the
growth and equity implications of using large-scale, multinational
agribusinesses as the engine of rural development. It ispossible that
broader- based, more equitable development will occur by stimulating
the growth of smaller, more traditional enterprises and firms.
J
DONOR EXPERIENCES
Several reports summarizing, donor experiences and
recommendations concerning rural and microenterprisesare now
available.The purposeof thissectionisto highlightthe key findings
ofseveral recent reports,
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
In manyways,AID hasbeena leaderamongthe donorsinsupport
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evaluated several attempts to provide assistance to these
enterprises. Later, the ARIES project and now the GEMINI project
continue that tradition. AID has also been important in supporting
research about small enterprises and the rural non- farm sector. Carl
Liedholm and colleagues at Michigan State University have
conducted research in this field with AID support since the 1970s.The
Harvard Institute for International Development has a long history of
research on the financial sector of Indonesia, some of it supported by
AID, that has helped reveal how financial reforms in that country have
helped the small-scale sector. In 1988 and 1989,AID undertook and
published the results of a major stocktaking of its experience in
microenterprise development (Boomgard 1989).
Liedholm and Mead prepared a paper in 1987 that represented a
comprehensive synthesis of MSU research findings up to that date.
The conclusions were largely drawn from in-depth studies conducted
in selected survey areas in six countries: Sierra Leone - 1974-1975;
Bangladesh - 1978; Jamaica - 1978; Honduras - 1979; Thailand -
1979; and Egypt - 1981. The small-scale industries in the study
included those establishments with fewer than 50 workers engaged
in manufacturing activitiesor related repair work.
The analysis of the sampled, firms revealed that they collectively
account for the bulk of industrial employment, are located in rural
areas (localities with less than 20,000 inhabitants), •most are very
small employing fewer than five persons, virtually all are privately
owned and are organized•as sole proprietorships, and the proprietors
and family workers make up most of the labor force. The amount of
capital used by these firms is modest, but larger thari that called for
petty trading or unskilled service activities. Most of the funds for
establishing or expanding these firms comes from personal savings,
relatives or retained earnings. Only a small amount comes from
formal financial sources or governments. The economic activities of
•these small- scale firms appear to be increasing in absolute terms
along with the employment absorbed by the small-scale private
sector.
The factors influencing the demand for and supply of goods and
services produced by the small-scale industries were examined.
Recent studies have revealed a strong positive relationship between
demand and growth of household income, debunking the popular
belief that small-scale firms produce inferior goods. A second source
of demand isfound inthe strong backward and forward linkages with
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scale industry. Ontheotherhand',government andforeigndemand
was limited formostfirms.
With respectto supply,most studiesshow that small-scale
iladustriesare efficient users of capital by generatingmore
employment perunitofcapitalthanlarge-scale firms.Output perunit
of capitalof smallfirmsalsotendsto exceedthatof largefirms.
Studiesofthesocialbenefitcostratioofsmallversuslargefirmsin
SierraLeone,Honduras, andJamaica showed thattheyweregreater
thanoneand largerforsmallfirmsin 10outof 12 industry groups
analyzed,butwidevariationsin efficiency amongthesmallfirms
appeared.The smallfirmsthatare mostlikelytobe economically
efficientwerefoundto havethepropensity to:(1) useworkers; (2)
operatein workshops awayfromthehome;(3) operateinlocalities
withmorethan2,000inhabitants; and(4)beinvolved inproduct lines/
activitieswithbettereconomic prospects, suchas tiles,furniture,
bakingandrepairactivities. Animportant findingisthatone-person
firmswerefrequently onthemarginofeconomic viability.
Liedholm andMead(1987)concluded thatsmall-scale firmscan
be enhancedbypolicychanges thatreducethebiasagainstsmall
firms, especiallythose controlsthat restrictinterestrates and
encourage lenderstorationscarcefundsto traditional larger-scale
clients.Policies promoting small-scale farmingare alsoa powerful
stimulus.
Projectsratherthan policy.reforms,however,have been the
primarymethodusedby government anddonors tosupportsmall
enterprises.Relatively few entrepreneurs receivethisassistance,
however.Specialcredit programsdesignedto assistsmall- and
medium-size firmsoftenendupproviding littlecredittothesmallest
firms.ButtheAID stocktaking concluded thatsomeprogramscan
reachthe smallestfirmson a self-sustaining basiswith minimal
subsidies.Liedholmand Mead arguethat the mostsuccessful
programs thatprovidenon-financial assistance arethosethatattempt
to supplya "singlemissingingredient," butthatpositionhasbeen
disputedby Boomgard.They also assertthatprojectsassisting
existingfirmsare morelikelyto be successful thanthosetryingto
establishnew ones. Similarto the WorldBankexperience,they
contendthatsuccessful projectstendtobebuiltonprovenexisting
institutions.
The stocktaking evaluation represel_ted a majoreffortbyAID to
evaluatewhatwasleaned about whatworksandwhatdoesn't work118 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
in its microenterprise projects (Boomgard 1989).1 It focused on
identifying projects and programs with proven effectiveness in
generating and sustaining developmental benefits, and in analyzing
the factors responsible for their success. (Throughout the study,
microenterprises were defined as firms that employ 10 or fewer full-
time workers.)
By the mid-1980s, AID was involved in at least 87 active
microenterprise projects or programs in 35 countries. A purposeful .....
sample of 32 projects and programs located in 20 countries was
selected for detailed study in the stocktaking. They were selected
because they targeted assistance to microenterprises, and some
analysis of beneficiary impact was available, in almost all cases, the
project or program studied either began operations in the 1980s or
AID's involvement started at that time. Data were obtained from
existing evaluations and site visits to 10 countries. Seven programs
were selected from Asia, including the large-scale indonesian BKK
program, 11from Africa, and 23 from Latin America. They are being
implemented by PVOs, government agencies and credit unions.
Some programs provide onlycredit to their beneficiaries, while others
also offer training and technical assistance.
Three distinct approaches to enterprise development were
identified in the study. The enterprise formation approach attempts to
help highly disadvantaged groups or individuals from the survival
economy develop viable businesses. Programs following this
approach often serve a relatively large proportion of new
entrepreneurs and acomprehensive range of services focused onthe
creation of rudimentary business skills, resulting mostly in income
generation rather than in new employment.
The enterprise expansion approach tries to improve 'the
performance of existing microenterprises. Essentially minimalist, it
emphasizes small improvements for many firms, often providing only
credit. The graduation of firms into small enterprises is largely left to
natural selection rather than project effort.
The enterprise transformation approach actively tries to graduate
entrepreneurs from micro to small enterprises, often by providing an
integrated mix of credit, training, and technical assistance. The firms
assisted are typically somewhat larger than those involved in the
other approaches; thus, employment generation plays a relatively
1. This sectiondraws heavilyfrom my earlier reviewof the Boomgardreport. Another
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larger role. Both the formation and transformation approaches are
transformation-oriented, and place heavy emphasis on technical
assistance and training. The expansion approach, on the other hand,
tries to support existing enterprises, and this accounts for the
minimalist-credit orientation.
Six of the sampled projects and programs were found to stress
enterprise formation, 22 enterprise expansion, and 14 enterprise
transformation. Because of multiple subprojects, the total number
exceeds the total sample size. A relatively small number of programs
in Latin America emphasize enterprise formation, while a relatively
large proportion in Asia and the Near East fall in the expansion
category. The sampled programs were evaluated on three criteria:
beneficiary impact, cost-effectiveness, and institutional sustainability.
The last criterion considered the three dimensions of financial,
organizational and environmental sustainability.
The principal results of the evaluation are summarized in Table 1.
The enterprise expansion data ale presented in columns three, four
and five. Column three gives the results of these programs treated
together. Since the group is heterogeneous, the results of the six
programs which operated primarily as financial institutions are
presented separately in column four, and the results of the remaining
programs are summarized in column five. In several cases data are
missing, and in other cases, a wide variance among the programs
within a particular group is present. Therefore, some of the
differences in mean values appear large but are not statistically
significant, as noted in column seven.
Most microenterprise programs serve only a few hundred clients,
with the exception of financial institutions that serve thousands.
Women represent a significant share of total beneficiaries in all
programs. The formation and transformation programs tend to serve
a larger percentage of manufacturing firms compared to other types,
but the differences are not significant. Given the large allocation for
training and technical assistance, average program costs are also
higher, but not significant.
The average loan size in transformation programs exceeded
$3,000 compared to approximately $500-700 in the other programs.
This finding suggests that attempts to graduate microenterprises to
small-scale firms require change in the firm large enough to justify a
relatively large loan. Loan size can be determined by comparing
average loan size relative to GDP per capita. The transformation
programs provide loans that average 10 times the average GDP perTable t
KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS
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capita, while other programs offer loans roughly one to two times
GDP per capita.
Most programs supply 25 to 45 percent of their loans to finance
fixed assets. The financial institutions in the expansion •programs,
however, provide mostly working capital which isconsistent with their
objective of helping clients make marginal improvements in their
businesses. By lending mostly working capital, these institutions also
• face less stringent staff requirements, making it easier to operate
large-scale institutions reaching thousands of clients.
The data in the bottom three lines of Table 1 give some indication
of the comparative cost-effectiveness and financial sustainability of
the programs. BecaUse of the modest services provided and their
large-scale operations, the average program cost is lowest for the
expansion programs -- at just under 50 cents for every dollar lent.
Transformation programs on average cost double that amount, while
formation programs cost six times more. One good indication of a
program's ability to recover costs is reflected in the interest rate
charged on loans. The expansion programs charge real interest rates
that average up to 25 percent, while the other programs have a large
subsidy element because they only,charge 0-3 percent. Even the
• relatively high rates inthe expansion programs do not cover program
costs.
The challenge to recover costs is further complicated by loan
delinquency and default. The programs report loan arrearages
rangingfrom 16to24 percentonaverage.Ifonlyhalf of theseactually
resultsin losses,loan lossesof 8 to 12percentare toohighfor most
programsto sustainwithoutcontinuousinfusionsof outside funds.
The expansionprogramscome closestto meetingself-sufficiency,
but generally the other programs are far from it. Financial self-
sustainability is closest to being achieved in the best-managed
programs which limit their assistance to low-cost financial services,
like the BKK and KUPEDES programs in Indonesia. Importantly, it
was observed that credit programs that strive to become self-
sustaining, even when the goal is unattainable, generally perform
better than those that expect continuing external support.
Organizations that think of themselves as businesses that live or die
on the basis of earnings behave differently had they not been
subjected to this market test.
The evaluation concludes that direct assistance programs aiming
to improve the performance of microenterprises without attempting to
transform them into more complex businesses have a better record122 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of achievement than the more ambitious transformation programs.
They typically provide small working capital loans with efficient
screening, rapid disbursement, and a reasonable assurance of the
availability of larger loans upon repayment. The beneficiaries are
poor, but not the poorest of the poor. The benefits of the programs are
modest for each client, but they increase the income of many clients
rather than create large amounts of employment. The organizations
implementing these programs adopt a business-like attitude toward
achieving a large volume of lending and operate in a market area
large enough to achieve economies of size, The evaluation also
identifies important qualitative factors affecting institutional
performance, such as aclear mission, strong leadership, well- trained
and dedicated staff, good management information systems, and
ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
The stocktaking results present a dilemma for microenterprise
support programs. On the one hand, programs may reach a large
number of participants on a self-sustaining basis if they limit their
support to small working capital loans. But this limited service may
not meet the total needs of many enterprises. On the other hand, it is
more difficult to achieve self-sufficiency if programs attempt to
provide expensive training and technical assistance services for their
clients. Furthermore, graduation from special microenterprise
programs is difficult. Therefore, an alternative is to graduate entire
microenterprise programs into credit retailers for larger-size loans for
longer-term purposes.
In spite of the mixed results achieved in these programs and
projects, the report recommends that AID continue to fund
microenterprise support projects. One reason is related to AID's
interest in stimulating policy change. The overall business and
economic environment in a country has a strong influence on the
opportunities available for profitable business ventures. By promoting
successful microenterprise interventions, AID can become involved
in policy dialogue concerning the need for and desirability of policy
reforms. AID can also be a strong advocate for the small business
community. Implementing projects provides a practical way to
accumulate information and influence decisions, in addition to
supporting research or including conditionality in foreign aid
programs.
A second benefit of AID support of microenterprise projects
concerns the development of financial markets. The report argues
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sector not so much because of perceived risk but due to huge
transaction costs. Innovations to reduce these costs that are
introduced, tested and perfected in projects may open up formal
lending to successful small-scale entrepreneurs. These innovations
may also lead to the development of new lending institutions willing to
serve a small-scale clientele.
European Investment Bank (EIB)
The European InvestmentBank (EIB) completed a review of its
lendingprogramfor small-scaleenterprisesin1989.The resultswere
reportedin APRODI (1989), EIB (1989) and by Carter et al. (1990).
Exceptas noted,thissynthesisisdrawnfromCarter et al.
Since 1976, the EIB has financed projects in 66 ACP (Asian,
Caribbean and Pacific) countrieswith its own resources raised in
internationalcapitalmarkets,andwithriskcapitalprovidedbythe EC
countries.Frequently,Dwnresourcesare usedforon- lending,while
riskcapital isused forequityparticipationor studies.About22 ofits
operationshave been channelledthroughlocalfinancialinstitutions,
generally developmentfinancecorporations(DFCs): Inthe 12-year
periodendingin 1988, US$363 millionhad beencommitted ofwhich
nearly 60 percentwent to 660 SME projects.Two-thirdsofthe funds
came from own resourcesand one-thirdfrom riskcapital. A totalof
42 countriesparticipated(27 African, 11Caribbean,and4 Pacific), of
which16were classifiedaspoor(withpercapitaincomesoflessthan
$450). Operations in the lower- incomecountries have benefitted
most from riskcapital.
The average size of subloanin these projectswas substantially
larger than thatof AID projectsat $322,000, buta thirdwas forless
than $165,000, Theaverage size tended to be bigger in larger
countries. The real average size has been falling over time
suggestingthat the DFCs are becoming more effectiveat reaching
smaller entrepreneurs. Sixty percent of the enterprises financed
employedless than50workers,and40 percenthad annualexpected
sales oflessthan$850,000 peryear.SincemostDFCs areprevented
fromfundingpublicly-ownedenterprises,mostenterprisesareowned
by localbusinessmen,and morethanhalfby a singlefamily.
About 60 percentof the subloanswent to the bankrollingof new
projects,26 percentexpansionofexistingenterprises,and 14percent
rehabilitation and modernization of enterprises. About two-thirds
were for import substitution, 17 percent export projects, and 19124 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Ioercentservices. Foodstuff, tourism and textiles received the largest
total allocations. The majority of projects were close to a debt/equity
ratio oT2:1, but equity contributions were higher for new projects. The
ex-ante economic rate of returnwas estimated at over 20 percent for
77 percent of the subloans, and between 11 and 20 percent for 20
percent, indicating that expected returns are quite high. The projects
in total were expected to directly create 28,000 jobs at a $28,000-
average cost per job created.
A post-implementation review was undertaken by having the DFCs
respond to a questionnaire for a random sample of 120 projects.
Interpretation of the results requires caution because the DFCs might
have given more favorable responses than are justified, and the
impact of structural adjustment recently undertaken in some
countries may produce greater financial problems for some projects
in the future than reported here.
The review showed a weak correlation between the ex-ante rate of
return and project success, and projects tending to dowell if they get
off to a good start. Excluding projects for which a company had not
yet been established, at the time of the survey about half of the
borrowers operated profitably,_a third operated at a loss, and the
remainder were inreceivership or liquidation. These proportions were
not significantly different across the three regions. The most
commonly cited reason (45 percent) for difficulty or failure was
market problems, which were particularly dominant in the Caribbean.
Technical and management problems were listed next, and a
shortage of foreign exchange ranked third. The results suggest that
market forecasts of borrowers tend to be overly optimistic, and the
difficult economic circumstances in many ACP countries are manifest
in weak markets rather than foreign exchange shortages for
entrepreneurs. Data onprojectcapacity utilization also reflected over-
optimism in project appraisals. The average capacity utilization was
about two-thirds, but was significantly higher (70 percent) for
expansion projects, and lower (55 percent) for new projects.
The more successful projects as measured by company
profitability were generally of two types: export oriented using local
raw materials, and domestic oriented utilizing imported raw materials.
Capacity utilization was highest in lthe former. Structural adjustment
which changed relative prices in favor of domestic inputs appears to
have benefitted export-oriented firms. Conversely, the domestic-
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high levels of protection, something that could be a difficulty in the
future given the structural adjustment that is called for.
The financial structure of a project was not an important source of
project failure, and many industries were able to bear foreign
exchange risks without prejudicing their financial stability. About a
third of the projects had been in arrears on their loan payment to the
DFC, and about a third had rescheduled their loans. On the other
hand, nearly 90 percent of the profitable SMEs never experienced
problems with debt service.
The evaluation highlighted the importance of the quality of the
assistance givenby the DFCs to local entrepreneurs (EID). The on-
lending rates of many institutions have often been too low relative to
inflation and the margins required for sustainability. This problem plus
their internal weaknesses in appraisal and supervision contribute to
the financial difficulties of many DFCs. When subloans encountered
problems, the DFCs have rarely been ina position to provide anything
other than purely financial solutions.
The evaluation also notedthe need for greater stability of economic
policies if SMEs are to prosper. Greater use of the commercial
banking system in projects was also advocated to help develop local
financial markets and financial intermediation. The EID was
encouraged to provide greater support for technical assistance in its
projects, to allow lending rates to be determined by market forces,
and, contrary to the views of several other donor agencies, to more
effectively target economic sectors, scale of enterprises, and sizes of
subloans.
International Labor Office (ILO)
The ILO recently completed its second progress report
summarizing activities undertaken within the World Employment
Program in the field of ruralsmall industries and non-farm activities
(ILO 1990). These include research; advisory services to
governments;design and implementationof technical cooperation
projects; evaluation of projects, programs, and policies; and
collectionand disseminationof information.The report containsa
summary of the evaluationsof the impactof their projects on rural
smallindustrialenterprises(RSIE). The reviewconductedbythe ILO,
UNDP, UNIDO andthe governmentofthe Netherlandsbetween 1985
and 1987 appears to have had a major impacton ILO views. This126 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
assessment produced several recommendations, of which some of
the most relevant ones follow:
1. Macroeconomic policies. Macro policies that favor growth of
rural income should be given priority in RSIE development
strategies, and must preferably precede supply-side support
measures. Likewise, the development of anagricultural surplus
is a precondition for stimulating RSIE. Donors and agencies
should focus on persuading countries to adopt appropriate
macro policies or insist on these policies as a precondition for
supply-side assistance.
2. RSIE support programs. Supply-side support to enterprises is
most effective if the demand environment is favorable and
consists of partial input"missing ingredient" support to existing
RSIE.Subcontracting from larger tosmaller industries should be
promoted through special training and extension programs..
General-purpose small industries development agencies should
concentrate on those functions they perform most effectively.
Credit must be made available in as decentralized a form as
possible, and the role ofnon-bank financial intermediaries should
be enlarged. Mobile training units ought to be stimulated for
technical upgrading programs. Greater use should be made of
NGOs and PVOs as agents of change. Existing institutions
should be used to implement projects rather than setting up new
ones. Technical cooperation designed to strengthen RSIE
institutions must firstcarefully screenthemfor their effectiveness.
3. Donor coordination. Donors and agencies have to harmonize
their external assistance procedures and coordinate their field
activities in support of RSIE.
It is obvious from this synthesis that the ILO has been heavily
influenced by the idea that macroeconomic policies must be set right
before RSIE projects can be effective. There are no suggestions
presented, however, as to how changes in policies might have a
differential impact on certain types and sizes of firms, and therefore
influence the effectiveness of RSIE projects. As noted in the EIB
evaluation, policy reforms will likely improve economic prospects for
some small firms, while making it more difficult for others, This fact
will have an impact on projects that target specific firms.MEYER: SUPPORTING RURAL NON-FARM ENTERPRISES 127
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
A review was conducted of the credit components of projects
funded by the United NationsCapital Development Fund (Jackelen
1989). From 1966 to December 1987, the UNCDF obligated$112
millionin 93 projectswithcredit componentsin 17 countries,mostly
Asian and African. The creditcomponentsamounted to $31 million
channelled through a variety of delivery mechanisms. Eighty-three of
the 93 projects concentrated in agriculture, industry and irrigation.
Fifteen projects representing 30 percent of all budgeted credit
components were selected for a detailed desk review. Three types of
credit delivery mechanisms were used in these projects: Type A -
financial institutions; Type B - grassroots institutions including
cooperatives, village associations and communities; and Type C - a
mix of financial and non-financial institutions. Two small industry
projects in Burundi and Yemen fell into the Type A category. These
projects encountered problems of the type frequently alleged to
prevent financial institutions from making small industry loans. To
name some: security requirements were high even when the project
specifically exempted them, transaction costs were high for small
loans, the loan approval process was time-consuming, and the
financial institutions have little capacity for outreach and supervision
of loans made. Recovery rates were low not necessarily because of
financial difficulties of the entrepreneurs; but due to the perception of
loans being "soft."
Two small industry projects in The Gambia and Bangladesh fell
into the Type C category. Inboth cases, a bank was used to provide
loans, while a government extension service offered direct assistance
to borrowers. Moreover, both projects were poorly implemented
because of a lack of clear definition of responsibilities, ineffective field
staff and absence of a well- developed staff training program, the
banks' inadequate accounting systems that provide timely
information on problem cases, and the projects' not being designed
to develop sufficient delivery mechanisms to accomplish their goals.
The evaluation concluded that the sampled projects, regardless of
type or sector of operations, shared a number of weaknesses. These
included the following: lack of clear-definition about the role of the
credit or revolving funds provided by the UNCDF to the project;
interest rates too low to cover costs; neglect of savings mobilization
and good accounting and management information systems; inability
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to project start-up; lack of effective technical assistance for these
institutions, especially in the critical linkage between the delivery
institution(s) and the borrowers; and failure to incorporate traditional
informal credit customs and practices into the projects.
Despite the evaluation's unfavorable conclusions about UNCDF
credit projects, it recommends that credit projects continue to be part
of UNCDF programs. Various recommendations are made about
how to make them more effective. Little Jssaid, however, about the
nature of the economic activities to be funded and the problems that
projects can expect to encounter when serving low- income people
who are the clientele of UNCDF programs.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
An evaluation of credit programs ofthe UNDP is reported in Ashe
and Cosslett. A review was conducted of 750 projects approved by
the UNDP between January 1987 and mid-April1988 to determine
those which were related to credit. Fifty-one of these projects (7.1
percent) were either related to or contained credit. The detailed
breakdownfollows:
1. 33 Type I projects with a creditcomponent;
2. 8 Type II projects in which the UNDP provides technical
cooperationto UNCDF projectsthat contain credit;
3. 3 Type III projectsin•whichthe UNDP providestechnical
cooperation for credit funds provided by international
development banks; and
4. 7 Type IV projectsin which the UNDP provides technical
cooperationto credit operations in the banking sectors of
developing countries.
A totalof$62.6 million,or6;8 percentof UNDP funds,wenttothese
projects. Projects in Africa and Latin America/Caribbean received
most of the funds in allcategories of projecttypes.
For the Type I and II projects, 44 percent were directed at
microenterprises,34 percentservedfarmers, sevenpercentassisted
fishermen, and two percent provided credit to aid housing
construction. Poor people were predominantly the intended
•beneficiariesof 70 percentof the projects.The majorityof the credit
componentswere inthe formof revolvingfunds,and thesecondmost
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minimal information about the design of credit components,
0_)erational costs or project efficiency, cash flow, loan payment,
probable project impact, or demand for funds. Sixty-0ne percent of
the projects lacked information on the likely number of borrowers to
be served, 85 percent had insufficient data on estimated loan size, 76
percent did not specify length ofloan, and 83percent failed to indicate
interest rates to be charged. With such a dearth of data, it was
impossible to estimate the sustainability of most projects.
To assess UNDP experience with project implementation, 16
credit projects were selected for a review of their evaluations and
project files. More than half of the projects were executed by FAO in
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, which explains the limited
information on rural non-farm or microenterprises per se. In fact, all
the project evaluations were so sketchy that important basic
information, such as amount of funds disbursed and average loan
size, was not provided, Sustainability was a key problem identified in
the evaluations. Insome cases the loan fund was not sustainable due
to inflation and poor loan recovery. Secondly, institutions that are able
and willing to provide credit to the poor ona long-term, ongoing basis
were not created. Thirdly, there were no sustainable increases in
capital for loan programs provided either from domestic or donor
sources.
This evaluation also contains a set ofguidelines for the design and
implementation of effective credit projects. The guidelines argue
among other things that credit projects will be most successful if the
borrower is a member of a solidarity group or other group guarantee,
has a need for short-term credit, and employs two persons or less.
These recommendations, therefore, imply a minimalist, non-targeted,
solitary-based approach to microenterprise lending. No attempt was
made in this evaluation to define the type of borrowers or sectors that
are likely to be successful over the long term.
World Bank
A comprehensivereviewof 15years of WorldBank experience in
lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was recently
completed by Webster (1990).2 The general objectives of these
projects include the strengthening of the financial and technical
2. A summaryof the report is also available in the 1990 journal article cited in the
bibliography, Boththe originalreport' and the summarywere consultedin preparingthis
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institutions that serve SMEs, job creation,and correction of financial
market imperfections that constrain small borrower access to credit,
_The review evaluated 70 World Bank projects in 36 countries
.representing$3.2 billion inloans covering the fiscal years 1973 (when
Bank SME lending was initiated) through 1989 (when 33 of the
projects were completed)2
The study emphasized the building of viable and sustainable
financial and technical assistance programs serving SMEs, and not
the financial and industrial policy reforms or project impact at the firm
level.
Projects in the Asian and Latin American regions each represented
about one-third of the volume of loans made, but the African region
had the largest number of total projects .(21 out of 70), and is the
region where World Bank SME operations are increasing. Almost 60
percent of the funds disbursed in the 33 completed projects went to
firms engaged in metal products, food processing, and textiles and
garments. The average subloan size for the completed projects was
$35,000, but within a project lies a wide range of subloan sizes. The
fact that actual subloan sizes were far below the maximum allowable
size is interpreted as evident of this reality: retail banks will not always
make the largest loans authorized in a project. Projects in Asia and
Latin America have been able to reach smaller borrowers than in
other regions because the pool of eligible borrowers is larger,
commercial banks have been used more frequently than
development banks and they tend to make smaller loans, and the cost
of doing business is lower, relative to the African region.
The completed projects created an estimated 600,000 jobs with
approximately half of this total represented in just two projects in
Indonesia. The average cost perjob created was $4,675. Many Asian
projects performed well in creating a large number of jobs at an
average cost of $3,171, compared with $9,650 in Africa. The African
projects appeared to involve relatively more subloans to purchase
capital equipment rather than use existing equipment or increase the
number of people employed as is commonly practiced in Asia.
The projects wereevaluated onthree criteria: the loans were small,
the number of jobs created surpassed expectations, and the
institutions were substantially improved through the project. For
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completed projects, 55 percent (18 of 33) achievedor surpassed at
least two of the three primary objectives, 12 percent attained one
objective, and 33 percent failed to reach anyof the primary goals?
The more successful projects had many of the following
characteristics:
1. Presence of favorable pre-existing country conditions, such as:
(a) strong demand for services provided by the project;
(b) effective institutions and individuals;
(c) sufficient leadership and commitment to the goals of the
project; and
(d) political, economic and regulatory environments stable
enough to allow project completion without frequent and
substantial shifts in policies and institutional leadership.
2. Selection of the strongest available institutions to implement
projects, which sometimes required resisting governmental
pressures to utilize poorly functioning public agencies.
3. Good project designs matching local demand for services with
existing operations andcapabilities ofimplementinginstitutions.
The better projects shared these design characteristics:
(a) extensively prepared with in-depth analysis of the most
promising sub-sectors to promote;
(b) demand for credit andtechnical assistance was judged fairly
accurately;
(c) delivery systems were designed to fit within existing
institutional operations; and
(d) program size andcomplexity wereConsistentwith institutional
ability.
4. Capable individuals held key leadership and management
positions in the project delivery system.
The sustainability of credit and technical assistance programs was
evaluated by assessing subloan repayment rates, the degree to
4. The firstWorldBankSME projectinthe Philippineswas classifiedin the secondgroup,
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which institutions incorporated SME services into their normal
operations, and the record of repeat projects in given countries. The
average repayment rate was 80 percent (highest of 92 percent in
Latin America, and lowest of 61 percent in Africa). Eight of the 33
completed projects had subloan repayment rates of 90 percent or
more, 15 had rates of 70 to 90 percent, and 10 had rates below 70
percent. A positive correlation was found between high repayment
rates and per capita GNP, but little correlation between repayment
and overall_macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, and business
environment. A consistent feature of successful projects was the
retail banks' ability to select viable subprojects, disburse funds
efficiently, and supervise projects.
World Bank SME credit projects employ lines of credit for
borrowers channeled through the formal banking system, either
directly to a single intermediary or through a second-tier system to
retail banks. Forty-two of the projects employed apex credit delivery
systems, 12 involved disbursements by development finance
institutions, and 16 used alternative arrangements. The projects
using apex credit systems, typically involving a mix of commercial
banks and deve!opment finance institutions, were more effective as
measured by smaller subloan sizes, higher job creation rates with
lower costs, and higher subloan repayment rates. Public finance
institutions with a general industrial finance mandate performed
poorly as single intermediaries in SME loans, particularly in Africa.
Subloan sizes have been relatively high, job creation low, and
repayment rates likewise low. The_majorfactors that have contributed
to the typical problems of DFIs include weak and frequently shifting
leadership, government interference, overall inadequacy and
inefficiency, and failure to develop operational strategies consistent
with small borrowers.
Most project components designed to provide technical assistance
(TA) for entrepreneurs have failed to meet objectives in quantity and
quality of services delivered. Poor project design, inadequate
preparation and supervision by the World Bank, and poor
implementation by government and public institutions were identified
as reasons for these poor results. The more successful projects had
fewer TA components, specific to a select group of beneficiaries,
were built on an existing successful program., and provided services
delivered to groups of persons with similar occupations.MEYER: SUPPORTING RURALNON-FARMENTERPRISES 133
Recent World Bank SME projects, many of which are in Africa,
have been designed to
1. promote greater involvement ofthe privatesector indelivering
technical assistance to SMEs;
2. broaden microenterprise access to credit and TA;
3. promote female entrepreneurs; and
4. increase the overall number of entrepreneurs.
They offer the potential of reaching smaller, and perhaps previously
underserved groups through especially designed programs, but the
weak institutional capacity of many institutions selected for project
implementation is a real concern. The reliance on NGOs in many
projects may be problematic, given their typic'alsmall size relative to
huge World Bank projects.
A World Bank report by Dessing (1990) specifically analyzes the
challenge of supporting microenterprise in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
report summarizes the literature on various types of programs to
assist microenterprises. The author describes the two main
strategies for supporting microenterprises: top-down indirect
approach, and bottom-up direct approach. The first seeks to improve
the business environment by changing microeconomic variables
such as pricesr government regulations and policies, and by building
up the physical infrastructure. This "getting-the-prices-right" strategy
is consistent with a laissez-faire doctrine of government, and relies
on people's creativity and initiative to respond to new opportunities
and incentives. The second approach aims to support
microenterprises directly and assumes a more active involvement of
the people in structural adjustments. This support often takes the
form of credit, training and technical assistance.
Dessing advocates a third approach which combines the so-called
process and minimalist approaches. Emphasis is placed on
..... improving access to credit because entrepreneurs frequently report it
as the most notable constraint. Moreover, several minimalist credit
programs have been successful at reaching a large number of
borrowers, especially the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the BKK
in Indonesia. She advocates an approach in which NGOs, PVOs,
business associations and government organizations as second-tier
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second-tier intermediary may eventually evolve or graduate into a
formal institution (or bank), whereas the concept of graduating the
microentrepreneur, although frequently espoused, is difficult to
achieve in practice.
An often neglected aspect of microenterprise support is capacity
building/upgrading of the institutions that support these businesses.
The quest by donors for short-term visible results mitigates against
this longer-term development support. Dessing argues, however, that
institution building should be incorporated into the microenterprise
support project as an explicit objective, and must be included in the
budget. Donors can also assist NGOs by providing management
information, sharing their often more extensive expertise and
research documentation, and helping hire external expertise.
However, there is an inherent conflict that must be resolved: most
NGOs have a social orientation while donors have economic
efficiency in mind. This fact leads some NGOs and PVOs to
categorically reject government and donor support.
DEBATE ABOUT THE ROLE OF SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES
The literature reviewed in the previous section reflects a concern
for two types of issues. First, the donor agencies are increasingly
concerned about the sustainability of their programs. At one time,
much of their concern was to document the efficiency of small-scale
firms that they were committed to assist because of equity objectives.
But as evidence mounted that many of the programs they supported
were not sustainable, they shifted their attention to factors that
influence sustainability. The current popularity of minimalist credit
programs reaching large numbers with efficient operations, high loan
recovery rates, and interest rates high enough to cover costs reflects
this shift. Instead of detailed targeting of types of enterprises to be
assisted, donors now tend to zero in on only the end users, not the
end uses.
The second issue which is most evident in the literature
surrounding AID and World Bank programs, but largely ignored by
other institutions, has to do with the economics of the small- scale
sector. Some of the evaluations recognize the important role of
microeconomic policies in affecting the performance of the small-
scale sector, but do not delve into the question of how the structure
of the economy changes with development and growth, and whether
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tohighlight someoftheissuesreflectedinthedebateaboutthefuture
ofthesmall-scale sectorindeveloping countries.
Arecent workshop sponsored byAIDprovided aforumforareview
of whathasbeenlearnedthrough AID'ssupport ofsmall,microand
informal enterprises. 5 Emphasiswas placed on discussingthe
researchconductedin the Employmentand EnterprisePolicy
Analysis(E.E.P.A.) Project.Snodgrasspresenteda paperwhich
summarizedthe debate aboutthe role of small and medium
manufacturingenterprises in industrialization and economic
development. HedefinedSMEsasfirmsemploying fewerthan100
workers.He argued that India was one of the first developing
countriesto advocatesmall-scale industrialization as earlyas its
1956 Industrial Policy Resolution.Subsequentresearch has
documented the positive roleof SMEsinthedevelopment ofChina,
Taiwan,Japan,andColumbia. Asnotedintheprevious section, the
research summarized byLiedholm andMeadsuggests apositive role
forSMEs in severaldeveloping countries. The researchbyLittle,
Mazumdar, andPage(1987)onIndiaandotherdeveloping countries,





countries is dualistic. There are a largenumber of small firms, a
substantialnumberoflargefirmswith 100or moreemployees,andin
between the "missing middle" in which there are few firms and
relatively less employment. There is also a wide diversity in
productivityamongfirms.Laborintensityisgreateramongindustries
thanamong.firmsizes;thus,pushinglabor-intensive industriesrather
than small firms may be a more efficient way of promoting
employment.
As countries develop,Snodgrassbelievesthat average-firmsize
risesin manufacturingandproductivityandwagedifferencesnarrow.
The riseinfirm size occursfortwo reasons:the industrialstructure
shifts in favor of industriesin whichfirmstend.tobelarge, andfirm
size grows within industries.These trends are due to changes in
technology, demand, transportation and information costs, firm
strategies,andgovernmentpolicies.Inter-firmproductivityandwage
differentials narrow because of improvedeconomicintegrationas
5. The proceedings of ltlis Workshop arereportedinme DEVRES summary,136 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
economies developand the marginal contributionof resourcestends
to equalize across firms and industries? Biggs and Oppenheim
(1986) argue that the aggregate size distribution of firms will be
influenced by policy bias with respect to size, sector or both.The best
way to reduce the share of large firms in manufacturing is likely to be
the elimination of bias in favor of industries in which output is
concentrated. Furthermore, it will often be counter-productive to
implement policies which attempt to improve the competitiveness of
small and medium firms.
Following this same line of thought, SnOdgrasscontends that small
firms in low-income countries are reservoirs of surplus labor. Only a
few have the potential for developing into medium and large firms,
and it is difficult to identify them in advance. Policies that explicitly
favor small firms, by providing subsidies through differential
application ofminimum wages, taxes, zoning, etc., can actually inhibit
their growth into medium-size firms and accentuate the missing
middle. On the other hand, the favorable policy treatment that large
, firms have obtained for themselves should be eliminated to gain a
more even playing field for competition.
The E.E.P.A. series of studies attempted to delineate
recommended policies for different types of country situations.
Snodgrass advocated a role for active government support of
industrialization, including the participation of SMEs; if it is
performance-based, as was the case in Taiwan and South Korea.
The trick, of course, is to limit government assistance to truly
deserving firms. The E.E.P.A. research in the Philippines,7Ecuador
and Honduras concluded that import substitution policies were biased
against SMEs, causing them to remain small and/or informal. It is
argued, therefore, that these countries need to reduce their anti-labor
and anti-SME policies, and open themselves up to moire foreign
competition.
The African countries pose the largest challenge and
disagreement within the E.E.P.A. research project. The Michigan
State collaborators in the project argue that micro-level intervention
is needed to create the conditions for economic growth. The Harvard
Institute for International Development (HIID) group represented by
Snodgrass, however, is skeptical because they feel that such
6. ApaperbyBiggsand Oppenheim(1986)presentsempiricaJ testsof thesearguments.
7. The Philippine researchisreportedinBiggset al., 1987.MEYER:SUPPORTING RURALNON-FARMENTERPRISES 137




The moststrikingdifferencenotedamongthe several donor
evaluations summarized inthepreceding pagesisthewiderangein
sizeof loansmadeinthevarious projects. Atthesmallendarethe
$500-700loansprovided intheAID-funded projects, whileatthelarge
endarethe$200-300,000loansintheEIBprojects. TheWorldBank
averageloansizeof$35,000fallsbetweenthesetwoextremes. The
small-size loansappeartobefocused onsimply helping family-based
firmstomakesmallimprovements, whilethelarger loansseemtobe
part of projectsthataimto makea largerimpacton employment
creation.
Despite the differences,a surprisingdegree of consensus
emergesintheseevaluations.
First, the donors are increasinglyconcernedabout project
sustainability. Suchapreoccupation seems toarisefromthecriticism
thatmanydonor-supported activities eitherfailduring thelifespanof
theproject,orareunable toreachanadequate performance levelthat
willkeepthemgoingoncedonorsupportisterminated. Therefore,
several evaluationsseek to identifyfactors that contributeto
sustainability.
Second,thereappears tobeadiminishing donor concern aboutthe
borrowers' reasons forobtaining loansandtheloans' impactonthem.
Someyearsago,donors wereheavilyinvolved intargeting theend
use of loans so that funds wouldbe channeledintoso-called
productive purposes. Therewasalsoimmense interest inmeasuring
theimpactoftheprojects onthepoor. Today,a greater appreciation
forthedifficulty inmeasuring impact because oftheinterchangeability
of loanfundsismanifest. Agreateracceptance issoapparentnow
that a positiveimpactcan be assumedif entrepreneurs valuea
programenoughtoborrowandrepaysotheycanbecomerepeat
borrowers.
Third, the macroeconomic environmentin whichsmall-scale
enterprises operate wasmentioned inseveral evaluations asafactor
that should be consideredwhen designinga supportproject,
However,relatively minimalevidenceispresented of theextentto
whichtheenvironment wasasignificant causeofaproject's success138 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
or failure, or the small-scale firms it was attempting to assist. Few
guidelines are provided about what specifically should be looked at in
project preparation besides the general issue of policy bias toward
large-scale industries. The extreme view is that projects should not
even be undertaken unless the macroeconomic environment is first
improved.
Fourth, there appears to be consensus emerging about the
features of a successful micro- and small-scale enterprise support
project. It should be minimalist (providing few services besides
loans), reach thousands of beneficiaries, operate on a commercial
basis with interest rates and fees high enough to cover costs, and
possess an ability to recover loans. Solidarity group lending is often
advocated as the means to efficiently lend and recover loans.
Emphasis is placed on targeting the poor as end users, but not
targeting the end uses of loans. Loans should be directed toward
enterprise expansion, rather than enterprise formation or
transformation. Institutions selected to implement projects should be
carefully screened and many require considerable assistance before
they can efficie.ntlyoperate loan programs,
Fifth, NGOs and PVOs are advocated as preferred implementing
institutions. However, there is aconcern about how many are actually
capable of handling the task. Like government agencies, many
require considerable strengthening because their formidable
commitment to the poor is not a sufficient attribute for operating a
sustainable program.
A sixth common feature of these evaluations is their concern for
client graduation. Most projects operate on the assumption that after
an initial period of special assistance, small-scale entrepreneurs will
be able to graduate to a commercial banking institution for loans. But
in practice, this rarely happens that is why suggestions that entire
programs eventually evolve or graduate into commercial lending
institutions are rife.
Seventh, it israthersurprising that the evaluations do not say much
about savings mobilization. First, savings mobilization will provide
support institutions another source of funds to help offset the
uncertainties of donor or government funds. Second, small-scale
entrepreneurs benefit as much from a secure place to hold their
savings as they will from getting loans. Third, encouraging
entrepreneurs to save will help them develop the concept of a
continuous banking relationship usually necessary for graduation to a
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Eighth, except for AID, donors support surprisinglyminimal
analysisaboutthe roleof small and mediumenterprisesin the
developmentprocess.The sustainability and growthof support
servicesto theseenterprises isinextricably linkedto howwellthe
sectorperformsovertime.Forexample,enterprises thatsubsistby
producing inferior goods willfinditdifficult tosurvive asruralincomes
riseandconsumers seekhigher-quality products. Providing support
totheseenterprises willaccomplish little.
A ninth pointthatemergesis the generallypoorand irregular
qualityof documentation available toevaluators. It appearstobea
problem forbothprojectdesigndocuments aswellasmonitoring and
evaluation reports. Thiscasualapproach todocumentation mayhelp
explainthe so-calledunbusinesslike institutions thatdonorsoften
support.
Finally, the tenthobservation is that none of the evaluations
recommended thatthedonordiscontinue orreducesupport forthe
small-scalesectorin spiteof all the difficulties identifiedby the
evaiuatorsin the past projects.An optimistic stance-- previous
shortcomings canbe rectified-- shinesthrough,it probablyalso
reflects a certain pragmatismby the evaluators;supportfor
microenterprises iscurrently animportant donor"fad"andfundswill
be pumped into these projectsuntil a new fad replaces it.
Furthermore, astrong NGOandPVOconstituency hasbeenbuiltup
thatwillcontinue topressure forfinancial support foritsinvolvement
inmicroenterprise projects.140 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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